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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The district court correctly held that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Valdez’s claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (the “ATCA”) because Valdez failed to state a
violation of a treaty of the United States or the law of nations as
required by that statute. See infra Part I. The district court also
correctly held that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims brought by Friends of Responsible Trade (“FRT’”) under
the citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (“RCRA”), because FRT’s
factual allegations failed to state a current and ongoing violation
of that statute. See infra PartII(D). The district court had
jurisdiction over EPA’s enforcement action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 6973, which empowers EPA to bring RCRA enforcement actions
in the appropriate district court.
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of
Appellants, Green Recycling Group (GRG) and Newtown Parent
Teachers Association, Inc. (Newtown PTA), on all claims on
August 31, 2009. The district court’s order granting summary
judgment as to all claims and all parties constitutes a final order
over which this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291.
Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1214 (9thCir, 2001).Accordingly,
jurisdiction is properly laid before this court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Whether Appellant, Juan Valdez, has sufficiently
alleged a violation of a treaty of the United States or the
law of nations to establish jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350;
II. Whether Appellant, Friends of Responsible Trade, has
alleged sufficient facts to establish constitutional or
statutory standing under the citizen suit provision of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a);
III. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency can
continue in an intervention after the underlying case
has been dismissed for lack of standing;
IV. Whether collecting used electronic devices for shipment
constitutes “disposal” of those devices as that term is
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used to define “solid waste” under Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et
seq.; and
V. If those devices are solid waste, whether they are
properly classified as hazardous.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FRT, an organization to which both Ventura and Valdez
belong (R. at 4), initiated this present action, alleging that GRG
and Newtown PTA violated RCRA, 42U.S.C. §§6901 et seq. (R. at
3). Specifically, FRT alleges that GRG and Newtown PTA
collected and sent UEDs abroad for salvage and recycling without
complying with RCRA’s requirements pertaining to the disposal
of hazardous waste. (R. at 3.) FRT and its two members seek
civil penalties for the violations, an injunction against further
violations of RCRA, and compensatory damages for injuries
suffered by the two members as a result of the violations. (R. at
3.) Valdez bases jurisdiction for his personal injury claim on the
ATCA and alleged that GRG and Newtown PTA violated
customary international law by shipping UEDs to Sud-Americano
without that nation’s consent. (R.at 3.)
EPA filed a motion to intervene pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
6972(d), which the district court granted. (R. at 3.) After full
discovery, FRT, joined by EPA, filed a motion for partial
summary judgment against GRG and Newtown PTA, asking the
district court to find that they violated RCRA. (R. at 3.) GRG
and Newtown PTA filed a countermotion for summary judgment
against FRT and EPA asking for a ruling either (1)that the
district court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action by FRT
and its members (and that EPA would then be prevented from
carrying on this litigation without the original parties); or (2) that
GRG and Newtown PTA had not violated RCRA. (R.at4.)
The district court granted GRG and Newtown PTA’s motion
for summary judgment with regard to all of FRT’s claims, finding
that FRT had failed to establish both subject matter jurisdiction
and standing. (R. at 4.) The district court found that EPA had a
proper basis for continuing the litigation without FRT—namely,
EPA’s independent ability to enforce RCRA against GRG and
Newtown PTA. (R. at 10.) Upon examination of the facts,
however, the district court granted GRG and Newtown PTA’s
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motion for summary judgment against EPA’s claim. (R. at 4.)
The district court determined that the UEDs collected by
Newtown PTA and shipped by GRG were “household waste” and
thus specifically exempt from hazardous classification under
RCRA. (R. at 1.) FRT and its two members timely appealed the
district court’s grant of GRG and Newtown PTA’s motion for
summary judgment. GRG and Newtown PTA also appeal the
district court’s ruling below that EPA had a proper basis for
continuing this litigation without FRT.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Over the past six years, Geraldo Garcia has operated a
salvaging business in the city of Pacifica, Sud-Americano. (R at.
6.) Sud-Americano is a developing country with no regulatory
scheme governing the recycling of used electronic devices
(“UEDs”) or the pollution potentially resulting from such
activities. (R. at 5.) Garcia imports shipments of UEDs from
abroad and sorts their components. (R. at 5.) Those UEDs that
are still useful are sold in the Sud-American market or donated to
local schools. (R. at 5.) Garcia hires Pacifican residents to
reclaim valuable materials from the remaining unusable UEDs.
(R. at 5.)
Because Garcia failed to supply his workers with protective
devices including gloves and masks, or equipment designed for
safe removal of material from UEDs, his workers were directly
exposed to mercury, lead, cadmium, chromium and other toxic
materials, endangering their health. (R. at 5-6.) Juan Valdez
was one such worker. (R.at6.) Valdez has worked in Garcia’s
operations since their inception, six years ago. (R.at6.) Expert
medical testimony has established that Valdez suffers from
memory and neurological losses of the type caused by mercury
and lead poisoning. (R. at 6.) In addition, because Garcia failed
properly to collect, contain, and manage waste from the
operations, mercury, lead, and other heavy metals entered into
the water and land of Pacifica’s local environment, further
endangering local inhabitants and potentially anyone
encountering the local environment. (R. at 6.)
GRG is in the business of collecting UEDs for sale to foreign
salvagers and recyclers such as Garcia. (R. at 4.) In the summer
of 2008, GRG entered into a partnership with Newtown PTA for
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the collection of UEDs. (R. at 4.) Newtown PTA solicited
members of households from within its community to donate their
UEDs for recycling. (R. at 5.) A significant number of the UEDs
collected by Newtown PTA were MyPhones. (R. at 5.) The
MyPhone uses a mercury-lithium battery and small quantities of
lead. (R. at 5.)
GRG requires anyone seeking free collection of UEDs to
execute a form acknowledging that the particular devices
collected were owned by them and used in their households. (R.
at 4.) Newtown PTA ensured that each person who donated a
UED complied with this requirement. (R. at 5.) Furthermore,
Newtown PTA members conducted a visual examination of each
UED they collected to ensure that all devices were intact. (R. at
5.) At the end of the collection process, Newtown PTA loaded the
UEDs onto a shipping container provided by Garcia (container #
VS2078). (R. at 5.) This container was then shipped to Garcia for
salvaging and recycling. (R. at 5.)
Ace Ventura is a freelance photojournalist. (R. at 4.)
Ventura learned that UEDs were often sent abroad to
unregulated recycling facilities whose activities sometimes
injured employees, neighbors and the environment. (R. at 4.)
Hoping to observe this phenomenon, Ventura traveled to Pacifica
where he made a documentary film of the activities of GRG,
Newtown PTA, and Garcia, highlighting the exposure of Valdez
and other workers and residents to the toxic materials from
Garcia’s work site, and the injuries possibly caused by those
exposures. (R. at 6.) Ventura’s film, “Toxic Recycling,” has been
awarded prizes for the best documentary film at three different
film festivals, has aired on public television, and has earned over
$100,000 for Ventura, net of expenses. (R. at 6.) Ventura has no
present physical manifestations of injury from exposure to toxic
material. (R. at 6.) However, he alleges that the dreadful sights
in Pacifica brought him to tears. (R. at 7.) Ventura also alleges
that he is so emotionally upset by seeing the pollution emanating
from Garcia’s operations and by seeing workers, such as Valdez,
whom he believed to be injured by such pollution, that he is
afraid to return to Pacifica. (R. at 7.)

5

APPELLEES_FINAL

976

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal appellate courts review the grant of summary
judgment de novo, using the same standards as the trial court.
Bruh v. Bessemer Venture Partners III L.P., 464 F.3d 202, 205
(2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1209 (2007). Summary
judgment is appropriate where there “there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Valdez has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction for
his claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (the
“ATCA”). The ATCA confers subject matter jurisdiction to the
United States district courts over any civil action by an alien for
torts committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States. The act of sending used electronic devices
(UEDs) abroad for salvage and recycling without the consent of
the recipient nation does not constitute a violation of the law of
nations.
Federal courts have consistently determined that allegations
of environmental harm do not state a claim under the law of
nations. Furthermore, customary international law generally
imposes obligations on states—not their individual citizens.
International law imposes obligations on private individuals only
in relation to conduct of universal concern (such as piracy, slave
trading, war crimes, and genocide).
Consistent with this
principle, the sources of international environmental law cited by
Valdez expressly limit their commands to the conduct of States—
not their individual citizens. As a result, Valdez has not alleged a
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
Therefore, the district court properly granted GRG and Newtown
PTA’s motion for summary judgment with regard to Valdez’s
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA.
The district court also correctly held that FRT did not have
constitutional or statutory standing with regard to its claims
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a) (“RCRA”). To establish Article III standing, FRT was
required to show: (1) that Ventura and Valdez have suffered
injuries in fact; (2) that their injuries are fairly traceable to the
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actions of GRG and Newtown PTA; and (3) that their injuries will
likely be redressed by a favorable decision.
FRT failed to identify any personal injury suffered by
Ventura other than the psychological consequence of being
brought to tears by the observation of the injuries of others.
Viewing conduct with which one disagrees is not a sufficiently
concrete and particularized injury for the purposes of Article III
standing. Furthermore, because FRT has not alleged that
Ventura ever had any plans to return to Pacifica, much less
concrete plans, his sudden fear of returning to the city is
immaterial and does not establish an actual or imminent injury.
FRT has also failed to establish that Ventura’s and Valdez’s
alleged injuries are fairly traceable to the conduct of GRG and
Newtown PTA. In this case, Garcia’s conduct is the sole
proximate cause of Ventura’s and Valdez’s injuries. FRT has
presented no evidence that GRG or Newtown PTA participated in
or even knew of Garcia’s disregard of the safety of his workers or
the environment. GRG and Newtown PTA have only the most
tenuous connection to Ventura’s and Valdez’s complained of
injuries. As a result, FRT has failed to establish traceability.
FRT has also failed to establish that Ventura’s and Valdez’s
injuries can be redressed by a favorable decision in the district
court. FRT’s claims for compensatory damages must fail because
this remedy is not expressly provided for in RCRA, and it cannot
be assumed that Congress intended to authorize this remedy by
implication. A prohibitory injunction will not remedy any of the
injuries alleged by FRT because, simply stated, there is nothing
to enjoin. Injunctions may issue under RCRA only where there is
a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to
pollute in the future. FRT has failed to allege a present or
imminent future violation of RCRA by either GRG or Newtown
PTA. Consequently, the imposition of civil penalties payable to
the United States Treasury is also inappropriate because the
purpose of such penalties is to deter future violations. Thus, FRT
has failed to satisfy the redressability requirement of standing.
EPA intervened in this case without raising any independent
claims or requests for relief. Accordingly, its case ended when the
FRT’s underlying suit was dismissed for lack of standing.
GRG and Newtown PTA are not liable under RCRA for
several reasons. First, the UEDs at issue in this case were not
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solid waste. Congress and EPA have together required that items
be “disposed of” in order to qualify as solid waste. Consistent
with RCRA’s purpose, which is to protect national land and water
from pollution by such waste, disposal by statutory definition
does not occur until the waste at issue is placed in the land or
water. In this case, it was a third party—Garcia—who disposed
of the UEDs; therefore, the UEDs were not solid waste at any
time that they were in the possession of GRG and Newtown PTA.
Second, even if the UEDs were solid waste in Appellee’s
possession, RCRA would still be inapplicable. FRT and EPA’s
argument for extraterritorial application of an Act of Congress is
only appropriate where Congress has clearly stated its intent that
the statute apply abroad. Here, the opposite is true. Not only is
there no evidence of intent to apply the statute extraterritorially,
but the statute’s text, purpose, and legislative history all clearly
show that Congress’ focus was exclusively domestic.
Finally, even if RCRA did apply extraterritorially and the
UEDs were solid waste, they would still not be subject to
regulation as hazardous waste. First, FRT and EPA have not
adduced sufficient information to demonstrate that the UEDs
actually met the standards for hazardous materials. Even if they
were in fact hazardous, however, GRG and Newtown PTA took
assiduous care to collect only used items from households; thus,
the UEDs fall squarely within the “household waste” exception.
Furthermore, the testing and reporting requirements that FRT
and EPA claim were violated apply only to “generators” of
hazardous waste. GRG and Newtown PTA did not “generate” the
waste in this case by any rational or pertinent definition of that
word.
For the foregoing reasons, GRG and Newtown PTA
respectfully request that this Court affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on all claims.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT DOES NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION TO HEAR VALDEZ’S CLAIMS
UNDER THE ATCA.

Valdez has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction for
his claims under the ATCA. The ATCA confers subject matter
jurisdiction to the United States district courts over any civil
action by an alien for torts committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Because GRG and Newtown PTA have not violated the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States, Valdez cannot meet this
threshold jurisdictional requirement. Accordingly, the district
court properly granted GRG and Newtown PTA’s motion for
summary judgment with regard to Valdez’s claims for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
A.

Valdez Has Not Alleged a Violation of the Law of Nations.

The act of sending UEDs abroad for salvage and recycling
without the consent of the recipient nation does not constitute a
violation of the law of nations. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 732 (2004), the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction
under the ATCA is only available to plaintiffs who allege
violations of international law as widely recognized and well
defined today as piracy was when the ATCA was enacted in 1789.
Under this rubric, Ventura has not alleged a violation of the law
of nations. As the district court stated:
There is surely nothing well defined about regulations dealing
with the export of hazardous waste. Even the determination of
whether materials are hazardous waste is a mind-numbing
journey. . . . There is simply no parallel between the then-wellestablished crime of piracy and the commercial shipment abroad
of used computers and cell phones.

(R. at 10.)
Furthermore, federal courts have consistently determined
that allegations of environmental harm do not state a claim
under the law of nations. See, e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru
Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 255 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the
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law of nations was not violated where an American mining
company caused environmental pollution and local illness in
Peru); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th
Cir. 1999) (dismissing plaintiffs’ international environmental law
claims due to the absence of any universally recognized
environmental principles); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775
F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the defendant’s
shipment of allegedly hazardous material to a purchaser in a
foreign country did not violate the law of nations). See also
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp.2d 534, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(dismissing plaintiffs’ claim under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens but also stating that “the specific claim plaintiffs
purport to bring under the ATCA—that the defendant’s oil
extraction activities violated evolving environmental norms of
customary international law . . . lacks any meaningful
precedential support and appears extremely unlikely to survive a
motion to dismiss”).
B.

Only State Actors Can Violate
International Law Cited by Ventura.

the

Sources

of

The district court correctly noted that “[t]orts giving rise to
ATCA jurisdiction are few and far between, because treaties and
the law of nations normally create obligations for countries, not
their citizens.” (R. at 9.) Although certain forms of conduct
violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting
under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals, this
principle is limited to activities of “universal concern” such as
“piracy, slave trading, war crimes, and genocide.” Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995). “Historically these
offenses held a special place in the law of nations: their
perpetrators, dubbed enemies of all mankind, were susceptible to
prosecution by any nation capturing them.” Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
Clearly then, “universal concern” is an extremely high
standard. Even heinous and despicable acts such as torture and
summary execution constitute violations of customary
international law only when committed by state officials or under
color of law. Flores, 414 F.3d at 244 (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-
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43). It cannot be seriously argued that GRG or Newtown PTA
engaged in conduct that is in any way similar to what the Second
Circuit described in Kadic and Flores.
Consistent with this principle, the sources of international
law cited by Ventura expressly limit their commands to the
conduct of states—not their individual citizens. Ventura claims
that GRG and Newtown PTA violated the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N.T.S. 397 (UNCLOS). (R.at9.) But UNCLOS directs
member countries—not their individual citizens—to take action
to prevent pollution on the high seas. For example, Article 207 of
UNCLOS, which relates to the pollution of marine environments
from land based sources, prefaces its directives with “States
shall.” Nowhere does the UNCLOS say “States and their citizens
shall. . ..” This language stands in stark contrast to that of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, which clearly states
that “[p]ersons committing genocide . . . shall be punished,

whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
Cf.
officials or private individuals.” (Emphasis added).
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, 23 I.L.M.
1027 (defining torture as “inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity”) (emphasis added).
Similarly misguided is Ventura’s reliance on Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, rev’d in part, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.
2006), hearing en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007),
aff’d, 550 F.3d 822 (9thCir. 2008). The plaintiffs in Rio Tinto
asserted that the defendant (a non-governmental entity) violated
a provision of UNCLOS mandating that “states adopt laws and
regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine
environment caused by land-based sources.” Id. at 1161. The
court held that UNCLOS reflected customary international law
and that the plaintiff had sufficiently established jurisdiction
under the ATCA. Id. However, were it not for the court’s finding
that the defendant “operated under the color of state law,” id., it
would be difficult to comprehend how a non-governmental entity
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could possibly violate customary international law by failing to
“adopt laws and regulations.” In this case, Ventura cannot
credibly argue that either GRG or Newtown PTA operated under
the color of state law. Accordingly, Ventura’s reliance on Rio
Tinto and UNCLOS is entirely misguided.
The same can be said of Ventura’s reliance on the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Waste and Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, I.L.M 657 (the
“Basel Convention”) and the Convention on the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development of December 14, 1960
(the “OECD”). Like UNCLOS, the directives of the Basel
Convention and the Decision-Recommendation of the Council on
Exports of Hazardous Wastes from the OECD Area, 5 June 1986C(86)64/Final (the “OECD Hazardous Waste Decision”), are
aimed at member states—not their individual citizens. For
example, Article 6 of the Basel Convention, which deals with the
“transboundary movement of hazardous waste between parties,”
prefaces its directives with “The State of export shall” or “The
State of export shall not.” Similarly, the OECD Hazardous Waste
Decision states “Member countries shall” and “Member countries
should require. . . .”
None of the sources cited by Ventura could be violated by
GRG or Newtown PTA. As a result, Ventura has not alleged a
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
Therefore, the district court properly granted GRG and Newtown
PTA’s motion for summary judgment with regard to Valdez’s
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA.
II. FRT DOES NOT HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR
STATUTORY STANDING.
The “case or controversy” requirement of Article III is the
“irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). To establish
standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he has suffered
injury in fact; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the actions
of the defendant; and (3)that the injury will likely be redressed by
a favorable decision.
Id.
These three elements are an
indispensable part of a claimant’s case and, as such, must be
supported with the manner and degree of evidence required at
the successive stages of the litigation. Id. at 561. At the
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summary judgment stage, claimants cannot rest on “mere
allegations” to satisfy their burden for these elements but must
set forth specific facts. Id.
To establish representational standing on behalf of its
members, FRT must demonstrate that Ventura and Valdez would
have personal standing to bring this suit in their own right.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972). Yet FRT has not
set forth sufficient facts to establish standing for either Ventura
or Valdez. Accordingly, the district court properly granted GRG
and Newtown PTA’s motion for summary judgment against FRT’s
claims under RCRA.
A.

Ventura’s Melancholy Is Not a Judicially Cognizable
Injury.

Ventura testified before the district court that he was so
emotionally upset by seeing the pollution emanating from
Garcia’s operations and by seeing workers, like Valdez, who were
injured by such pollution that he is afraid to return to Pacifica.
(R. at 7.) He also testified that sights in Pacifica brought him to
tears. (R.at7.) These are the sum total of the injuries alleged by
Ventura. He has not alleged any particular physical injury from
GRG and Newtown PTA’s activities. (R. at 7.) Nor has he alleged
any fear of becoming ill from his exposure to the pollutants in
Pacifica. FRT’s failure to allege these injuries before the district
court is fatal to any claim alleging such injuries on appeal. See,
e.g., Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 263 (3dCir. 2009)
(stating that the failure to raise an argument before the district
court generally results in the waiver of that argument on appeal).
FRT failed to identify any personal injury suffered by
Ventura other than the psychological consequence of being
brought to tears by the observation of the injuries of others. In

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982),
the Supreme Court held that viewing conduct with which one
disagrees is not a sufficiently concrete and particularized injury
for the purposes of Article III standing. Furthermore, the
decision to seek review is not to be placed in the hands of
“concerned bystanders,” like Ventura who will use it simply as a
“vehicle for the vindication of value interests.” United States v.
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SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973). To the contrary, the injury in
fact test “requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It
requires that the party seeking review be himself among the
injured.” Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35.
The injury in fact requirement protects a fundamental
interest of the justice system:
It [serves] as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to
whether review will be sought in the hands of those who have a
direct stake in the outcome. That goal would be undermined
were [courts] to . . . authorize judicial review at the behest of
organizations or individuals who seek to do no more than
vindicate their own value preferences through the judicial
process.

Id. To recognize standing premised on Ventura’s passing and
insubstantial “injuries” would open the floodgates to the most
frivolous claims. For example, there is little separating Ventura’s
alleged injuries from those of the several thousand theater-goers
and television viewers who were saddened by the images in
Ventura’s film, “Toxic Recycling.” It cannot truly be said that
either Ventura or his film audience has a direct stake in the
outcome of this case. Ventura may be saddened by what he saw
in Pacifica, but his claim is nothing more than an attempt to
vindicate his personal value preferences through the judicial
process.
B.

Ventura’s Fear of Returning to Pacifica Is Insufficient to
Establish an Injury in Fact.

The Supreme Court has defined “injury in fact,” to mean an
invasion of a legally protected interest that is “(a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. Ventura’s
fear of returning to Pacifica does not satisfy either of these
requirements. Ventura visited Pacifica on only one occasion. He
has not alleged that he ever had any plans to return to the city,
much less any concrete ones. To the contrary, the facts in the
record suggest that Ventura’s connection to Pacifica terminated
at the moment that his cameras stopped rolling.
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In Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 560-61, the Supreme Court
held that the plaintiffs’ “intent to return to the places they had
visited before—where they will presumably, this time, be
deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered
species—is simply not enough” for constitutional standing. “Such
‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans,
or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do
not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that [the
Court’s] cases require.” Id. Because FRT has not alleged that
Ventura ever had any plans to return to Pacifica, his sudden fear
of returning to the city is immaterial and does not establish an
actual or imminent injury. Furthermore, FRT has not made clear
exactly what Ventura experienced during his first visit to Pacifica
that he may be deprived of upon his hypothetical next visit.
Indeed, Ventura went to Pacifica to witness human suffering and
environmental pollution.
Measured against this baseline,
Ventura cannot claim that he will be deprived of any cognizable
interest.
C.

Ventura’s and Valdez’s Injuries Are Not “Fairly
Traceable” to the Conduct of GRG or Newtown PTA.

FRT has failed to establish that Ventura’s and Valdez’s
alleged injuries are fairly traceable to the conduct of GRG or
Newtown PTA. The “fairly traceable” requirement is in large
part designed to ensure that the injury complained of is “not the
result of the independent action of some third party not before the
court.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504U.S. at 560.
In this case, Garcia’s conduct is the sole proximate cause of
Ventura’s and Valdez’s injuries. It was Garcia who failed to
supply his workers with protective devices such as gloves, masks,
and equipment designed for safe removal of material from UEDs.
(R. at 5-6.) It was Garcia’s reckless disregard of his workers’
safety that led those workers to be exposed to mercury, lead,
cadmium, chromium and other toxic materials. (R. at 6.) And it
was Garcia’s failure to properly collect, contain, and manage
waste from his salvaging operations that caused mercury, lead,
and other heavy metals to enter into the water and land of the
Pacifican environment, further endangering local inhabitants and
those encountering the local environment. (R. at 6.)
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FRT has presented no evidence that GRG or Newtown PTA
participated in or even knew of Garcia’s disregard of the safety of
his workers or the environment. (R.at8.) FRT has not even
alleged that GRG or Newtown PTA should have known about
Garcia’s reckless and reprehensible conduct. Accordingly, GRG
and Newtown PTA have only the most tenuous connection to
Ventura’s and Valdez’s complained of injuries. As the Supreme
Court warned in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975), the
indirectness of an injury “may make it substantially more
difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Article III: to
establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of
the defendants’ actions, or that prospective relief will remove the
harm.”
Ventura’s claims of traceability are especially tenuous
because the line of causation between GRG and Newtown PTA’s
conduct and his alleged injuries runs through two independent
actors: Garcia and himself. As previously noted, Ventura went to
Sud-Americano for the sole purpose of documenting human
suffering and environmental pollution. Having knowingly and
intentionally exposed himself to these dreadful conditions,
Ventura cannot now seek to hold GRG and Newtown PTA liable
for his resulting “injuries.”
FRT’s claims of traceability are entirely opportunistic and a
direct result of its inability to bring a claim against Garcia, the
person who is truly responsible. Because Sud-Americano is a
developing country with no regulatory scheme governing the
recycling of UEDs or the potential pollution resulting from such
activity (R. at 5), Garcia is likely unassailable in any SudAmerican court. Furthermore, United States courts do not have
personal jurisdiction over Garcia while he remains in SudAmericano. Accordingly, this entire litigation boils down to FRT’s
desperate search for an open courtroom and an open coffer.
Unfortunately, FRT’s impetuous grab for cash has forced GRG
and Newtown PTA to defend themselves in a protracted and
costly litigation despite having only the most tenuous connection
to the complained of injuries.
D. Ventura’s and Valdez’s Injuries Cannot Be Redressed by a
Favorable Decision in the District Court.
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RCRA’s comprehensive remedial scheme does not provide for
compensatory damages or equitable restitution. Meghrig v. KFC
Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
Consequently, FRT’s claims for compensatory damages for
injuries suffered by Ventura and Valdez as a result of the alleged
RCRA violations must fail. See Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 487 (stating
that “where Congress has provided elaborate enforcement
provisions for remedying the violation of a federal statute, as
Congress has done with RCRA . . . it cannot be assumed that
Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial
remedies for private citizens suing under the statute”).
A private citizen suing under RCRA’s citizen suit provision,
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a), may seek two different forms of injunction: a
mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible party to
take action by attending to the cleanup and proper disposal of
toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one that restrains a
responsible party from further violating RCRA. Meghrig, 516
U.S. at 484 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2)). FRT has not sought an
injunction ordering either GRG or Newtown PTA to take action
by attending to the cleanup and proper disposal of the toxic waste
in Pacifica. FRT has only sought a prohibitory injunction to
restrain GRG and Newtown PTA from further violating RCRA.
(R. at 3.)
Nevertheless, a prohibitory injunction will not remedy any of
the injuries alleged by FRT because, simply stated, there is
nothing to enjoin. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), which contains the same “to be in
violation” language as RCRA (42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A)), to
require that “citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous
or intermittent violation—that is, a reasonable likelihood that a
past polluter will continue to pollute in the future.” Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49,
57 (1987) (emphasis added). Like the Clean Water Act, RCRA
can only be violated through present or future conduct, not an
extant environmental condition.1
1. Cf. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (imposing liability on (1) current owners and
operators of facilities where hazardous substances are released or threatened to
be released; (2) owners and operators of facilities at the time the substances
were disposed; (3) persons who arranged for disposal or treatment of such
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FRT has failed to allege a present or imminent future
violation of RCRA by either GRG or Newtown PTA. The alleged
violation occurred in 2008 and involved one shipment of one
container. (R. at 8.) The solitary act of shipping one container
can not properly be described as a “continuous” or “intermittent”
violation by any plausible definition of those words.
Furthermore, FRT has not alleged that Newtown PTA has any
future plans to solicit other UEDs for shipment. The district
court correctly pointed out that, “[a]s far as Newtown PTA is
concerned, this was a one-time, isolated activity.” (R.at 8.) GRG
has sent other containers of similar materials abroad for salvage
and recycling on several previous and subsequent occasions but
never to Pacifica or anywhere else in Sud-Americano. (R. at 8.)
GRG also has an open-ended contract with Garcia for potential
future containers of UEDs to be sent to Pacifica under specified
terms, but no such shipments have occurred to date. (R. at 8.)
This prompted the district court to remark that the cessation of
shipments was “presumably because of the pendency of this
litigation.” (R. at 8.)
Nevertheless, even if the district court’s presumption were
correct, it would have no bearing on the current dispute. In Steel
Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 109
(1998), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that there is a
presumption of future injury when the defendant has voluntarily
ceased its illegal activity in response to litigation. Instead, the
Court held that the allegations of future injury must be
“particular and concrete.” Id. In this case, FRT has not, and
cannot allege particular and concrete future injuries because
GRG itself does not have any particular or concrete plans to ship
additional containers of UEDs to Pacifica. Nor has FRT alleged
that GRG had any such plans prior to their filing of this suit. See
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.,
890 F.2d 690, 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (interpreting the Supreme
Court’s holding in Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49 (1987), to stand for the
substances; and (4) persons who accepted such substances for transport for
disposal or treatment. These parties are liable for all costs of removal or
remedial action).
It is for this reason that FRT’s claims are more amenable to establishing
standing under CERCLA as opposed to RCRA.
Unlike RCRA, which
promulgates ex ante regulations, CERCLA sets forth ex post remedies for extant
environmental pollution.
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proposition that the correct point from which to assess the
likelihood of continuing violations is not the present but the date
of filing suit).
Finally, the imposition of civil penalties payable to the
United States Treasury under 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(g) is not an
appropriate remedy in this case because the purpose of such
penalties is to deter future violations. Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185
(2007). As already stated, FRT has failed to allege that GRG or
Newtown PTA has particularized and concrete plans to send
other UEDs to Pacifica in the future. Thus, FRT has failed to
satisfy the redressability requirement for standing.
For all these reasons, the district court correctly granted
GRG and Newtown PTA’s motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that FRT failed to establish standing.
III. EPA CANNOT CONTINUE AS INTERVENOR IN A
SUIT, DISMISSED FOR LACK OF STANDING, IN
WHICH EPA NEVER MADE AN INDEPENDENT
CLAIM.
Because EPA never made an independent claim in this case,
its intervention has always been ancillary to the original suit.
When that suit was dismissed for lack of standing, EPA’s request
to continue as an intervenor became, in essence, a request for an
advisory opinion.
EPA’s request runs afoul of the fundamental principle that
intervention cannot cure a defect in jurisdiction. “It is wellsettled that since intervention contemplates an existing suit in a
court of competent jurisdiction and because intervention is
ancillary to the main cause of action, intervention will not be
permitted to breathe life into a ‘nonexistent’ law suit.” Fuller v.
Volk, 351 F.2d 323, 328 (3d Cir. 1965) (citing United States ex rel.
Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157 (1914)). As
the Supreme Court explained in McCord, an “intervention [is]
what it purport[s] to be, an appearance in the original suit,
already brought, and in our view must abide the fate of that suit.”
McCord, 233 U.S. at 163-64.
While a district court has discretion to treat the pleading of
the intervenor as a separate action where the intervenor “has a
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separate and independent basis for jurisdiction,” the purpose of
that device is to “adjudicate the claims raised by the intervenor.”
Fuller, 351 F.2d at 328. See also GTE Cal. v. FCC, 39 F.3d 940,
947 (9th Cir. 1994) (declining to transform an intervention into a
broad-based challenge). Yet there is nothing in the record to
indicate that EPA ever raised a claim independently of FRT or
either of its members.
Unsupported by any independent claim, EPA’s interest in
this case is best understood as the interest of an agency in the
judicial interpretation of a statute it administers. Yet even a
“strong interest in obtaining a ruling” is irrelevant to the
propriety of continuation—”the desirability of an advisory opinion
is not a substitute for justiciability.” Ruotolo v. Ruotolo, 572 F.2d
336, 338 (1st Cir. 1978) (finding the government’s continuation in
a suit improper where the government had not alleged an
independent basis for its suit).
Because EPA had not alleged an independent interest when
the primary suit was dismissed, EPA’s intervention “must abide
the fate of that suit.” McCord, 233 U.S. at 164. If EPA wishes to
assert its own claim, the administrative process provides the
proper forum.
IV. GRG AND NEWTOWN PTA HAVE NOT VIOLATED
RCRA AND ARE NOT SUBJECT TO LIABILITY
UNDER RCRA.
The offenses alleged by FRT and EPA in this case are outside
the scope of RCRA. Even were that not so, the undisputed facts
show no violation of RCRA and no grounds for liability.
A. The UEDs Are Not Solid Waste under RCRA.
Under the language of RCRA, as well as EPA’s regulations
interpreting that statute, the UEDs at issue in this case were not
solid waste at the time that GRG collected and shipped them.
Whether the UEDs were “solid waste” depends on whether they
were “disposed of” as that term is defined by the statute. Because
they were not disposed of within the statute’s meaning, they were
not solid waste.
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Solid waste is defined by RCRA as “any garbage, refuse,
sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment
plant, or air pollution facility and other discarded material,
including. . . from industrial, commercial, mining, and
agricultural operations. . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (emphasis
added). EPA has defined “discarded material” as any material
which is “abandoned.” 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)(i). (There are other
ways a material may qualify as “discarded,” but no party has
argued that they apply in this case, and they do not.)
“Abandoned,” in turn, is material “disposed of,” §261.2(b)(1), or
“accumulated. . . before or in lieu of being abandoned by being
disposed of,” § 261.2(b)(3). (Again, the other ways of being
abandoned are clearly not implicated by the facts of this case.)
While “accumulated” is undefined, RCRA defines “disposal” as
“the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or
placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land
or water so that [it may] enter the environment or be emitted into
the air or discharged into any waters. . ..” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).
Simply put, the UEDs in this case were only solid waste if
they were either “disposed of” as defined by § 6903(3) or
“accumulated” before ultimate disposal. Because these UEDs
were neither “disposed of” nor “accumulated,” they were not solid
waste.
1. The UEDs Had Not Yet Been “Disposed Of” While They
Were in the Possession of GRG and Newtown PTA.
Congress provided a clear statutory definition of “disposal” as
being placed into or on any land or water so as to make
contamination possible. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (“The term ‘disposal’
means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or
on any land or water so that [it may] enter the environment or be
emitted into the air or discharged into any waters. . ..” Leaving
aside the circularity of ultimately defining solid waste by a
definition which includes the term solid waste, it is nonetheless
clear that the definition cannot apply to the UEDs in this case.
GRG and Newtown PTA did not in any way place the UEDs
into land or water in such a way that they could have
contaminated such land or water, nor is it anywhere alleged in
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the record that they did. The UEDs were therefore not “disposed
of” as understood by RCRA.
The district court’s contrary conclusion rested on a common
understanding of the term “disposal”—”[w]hen the citizens of
New Union gave their UEDs to GRG and Newtown PTA, they
were disposing of those devices, hence the devices became solid
waste under this definition.” (R. at 11.) But this understanding
of the term “disposal” is necessarily perspective-driven: one
person’s disposal is another’s acquisition. When assessed in light
of the statutory definition of the term, the UEDs in this case were
clearly not disposed of.
Because the UEDs were not disposed of, they could not
possibly have been solid waste unless, via the relevant EPA
regulations, they were “accumulated. . . before or in lieu of being.
. . disposed of.” 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b)(3).
2. The UEDs Were Not “Accumulated.”
Although “accumulated” is a term that is left undefined by
the pertinent regulations, 40 C.F.R. §261.2(b)(3), any definition
consistent with the purpose and intent of RCRA compels the
conclusion that the UEDs in this case were not “accumulated. . .
before or in lieu of being. . . disposed of.” Id.
Congress’ purpose in enacting RCRA was “to reduce the
generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the proper
treatment, storage, and disposal of that waste which is
nonetheless generated, ‘so as to minimize the present and future
threat to human health and the environment.’” Meghrig v. KFC
Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
6902(b)). Thus Congress’ findings focused on “a rising tide of
scrap, discarded, and waste materials,” and “the problems of
waste disposal [that] necessitate. . . proper and economical waste
disposal practices.” 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a).
Because Congress was clearly concerned with the potential ill
effects of solid wastes on human health and the environment, the
relevance of RCRA to the UEDs in this case ultimately depends
on their disposal in land or water. The reports that FRT and
EPA cited below are in accord: the Timothy investigation found
that not all UEDs exceed the threshold for hazardous waste
determination, and its report states cautiously that such devices
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“could potentially be classified as . . . hazardous waste when
discarded.”
Timothy G. Timothy, et al., RCRA Toxicity

Characterization of CPUs and Other Discarded Electrical
Devices, 1-3 (2004), available at http://www.ees.ufl.edu/homepp/
townsend/Research/ElectronicLeaching/UF%20EWaste%20TC%2
0Report%20July%2004%20v1.pdf (emphasis added).
The D.C. Circuit rejected a similar attempt at overreaching
in American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir.
1987). That court noted that the statutory definition of solid
waste “contains three specific terms and then sets forth the
broader term, ‘other discarded material.’” Id. at 1189. The court
thus invoked ejusdem generis, the canon of statutory construction
that states that broad or ambiguous terms should be interpreted
in the context of the other terms with which they appear. Id.
“[G]arbage, refuse, and sludge from a waste treatment plant,
water supply treatment plant, or air pollution facility” all “clearly
fit within the ordinary, everyday sense of ‘discarded.’” Id. at 1190.
Therefore, the court reasoned that “Congress, in adding the
concluding phrase ‘other discarded material,’ meant to grant EPA
authority over similar types of waste, but not to open up the
federal regulatory reach of an entirely new category of materials,
i.e., materials neither disposed of nor abandoned. . ..” Id.
The same reasoning applies to this case. In the context of the
statutory definition of solid waste, Congress meant to grant EPA
authority over discarded waste. Id. Congress could not have
intended to grant EPA authority over any materials, potentially
“waste” at some future date, whenever they are “accumulated.”
Since every consumer product will at some point be disposed of,
all such products that are accumulated are technically
accumulated “before” being disposed of. Thus EPA’s regulation,
classifying as “abandoned” any materials “accumulated. . . before
or in lieu of being. . . disposed of,” § 261.2(b)(3), can only make
sense with respect to materials accumulated for the purpose of
disposal. Otherwise, a shipment of MyPhones from the
manufacturer to a distributer, or from a distributer to a retailer,
would be subject to EPA regulations as “solid waste,” because
they would be accumulations of materials that will ultimately be
solid waste when disposed of, and thus “abandoned” by the EPA’s
definition. Congress could not have intended this absurd result,
which does nothing to further the purpose of the statute.
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GRG and Newtown PTA did not accumulate the UEDs for
the purpose of disposal. Rather, their specific purpose was to sell
them to a third party, Geraldo Garcia. (R. at 5.) While Garcia
may have bought the UEDs with the purpose of disposing of
them, Garcia’s motive was not pertinent to GRG and Newtown
PTA’s decision to accumulate those items. Since it appears that
Garcia disposed of these materials, he is the one who
accumulated the material in order to dispose of it. Id.
By analogy, had GRG and Newtown PTA collected the UEDs
and sold them to a waste disposal company in the United States,
and had that company dumped the UEDs in a landfill or a river,
FRT and EPA could properly proceed against the waste disposal
company—not against GRG and Newtown PTA. The same is true
in this case.
The UEDs in this case were not “disposed of” as defined by
RCRA, and they were not accumulated for that purpose;
therefore, they were not “solid waste” at any time during which
they were in GRG and Newtown PTA’s possession.
B. RCRA Does Not Provide for Extraterritorial Application.2
Even if the UEDs were solid waste, the district court
correctly reasoned that they ceased to be so for the purposes of
the statute when they left the United States, because RCRA does
not apply outside the United States. (R. at 11.)
RCRA’s limitation to domestic waste disposal accords with
the “longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros.,
Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). The Supreme Court has
described this as a clear statement rule: “Congress legislates
against
the
backdrop
of
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality [which applies] unless there is ‘the affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed’” that the statute

2. Although normally this issue would be antecedent to any consideration of
whether the UEDs were solid waste, the organization of Part IV of this brief
tracks the reasoning of the district court’s opinion below.
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should apply abroad. Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. at 248
(quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138,
147 (1957)).
The leading case applying this principle to RCRA has
reached the conclusion that Congress did not provide for
extraterritorial application. See Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC
Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The Amlon court
reached its conclusion after an extensive analysis of the language
and structure of RCRA, as well as the statutes’ legislative history.
Id. at 674-76.
1. The Text of RCRA, its Structure, and its Purpose All
Counsel Against Extraterritorial Application.
The Amlon court noted that the various provisions of RCRA
indicate that “Congress was concerned with hazardous waste
problems in the United States, not in foreign countries.” Id. at
675. For example, the first section of RCRA, explaining “the
issues that RCRA was passed to address,” id., describes waste
disposal as “a matter national in scope and concern.” 42. U.S.C. §
6901(a)(4). Congress found that “many of the cities in the United
States will be running out of suitable solid disposal sites within
five years unless immediate action is taken.” 42 U.S.C. §
6901(b)(8).
RCRA also contains no provisions for venue for citizen suits
concerning waste located in a foreign country. Amlon, 775 F.
Supp. at 675. And the statute does not address how the
sovereignty of other nations would be affected by its application,
although it includes a number of such provisions designed to
respect state sovereignty. Id. at 676 (citing as an example 42
U.S.C. §6973(a), which requires notice to affected states, and
noting the absence of any such provision for affected foreign
nations).
Public policy concerns also favor the interpretation of RCRA
as having exclusively domestic application. The presumption
against extraterritoriality serves in part the purpose of respecting
foreign nations’ sovereignty. Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. at
248. In the context of RCRA, extraterritorial application could
create exactly the sort of foreign relations difficulties that the
presumption is intended to prevent. For example, a foreign
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citizen whose government had consented to import hazardous
waste would be able to sue in the United States to have the waste
Amlon, 775F.Supp. at 676 n.11 (explaining how
removed.
extraterritorial application of RCRA would violate public policy).
2. Amlon‘s Holding, that RCRA Does Not Apply
Extraterritorially, is Also Bolstered by Legislative
History and Subsequent Commentary.
That the text of the statute itself indicates no extraterritorial
application should be dispositive. See, e.g., City of Chicago v.
Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994)
(explaining that “it is the statute [RCRA], and not [the legislative
history], which is the authoritative expression of the law.”)
Nevertheless, the Amlon court also looked to the legislative
history behind RCRA, and found nothing there to justify a finding
of extraterritoriality. Amlon, 775 F. Supp. at 674. As it was
uncontested in that case that “the initial focus of Congress when
passing RCRA was entirely domestic” id. (emphasis added), the
court looked for any indication that Congress nonetheless
intended extraterritorial application. However, the Amlon court
only found more evidence that Congress was concerned solely
with domestic waste, and found “virtually no evidence in the
legislative history to support” a contrary view. Id.
In the wake of Amlon, commentators have consistently
agreed that the court correctly found that RCRA does not apply
extraterritorially. See, e.g., Lisa T. Belenky, Cradle to Border:

U.S. Hazardous Waste Export Regulations and International
Law, 17 Berkeley J.Int’l L. 95, 135 (1999) (staing that “federal
courts are likely to concur in the analysis of the lack of
extraterritoriality of RCRA or CERCLA found in Amlon Metals”);
Lee I. Raiken, Extraterritorial Application of RCRA: Is Its
Exportability Going to Waste?, 12Va. Envtl. L.J. 573, 583 (1993)
(stating that “it appears that Judge Conner [the author of the
Amlon opinion] correctly evaluated the legislative history in
holding that the RCRA citizen suit provision is unavailable when
the injury did not occur in this country”). If the titles of these
papers indicate that their authors would prefer RCRA to apply
abroad, they nonetheless acknowledge that Congress must make
this change, not the courts.
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Appellants Have Failed to Demonstrate that the UEDs
Were Hazardous Waste under RCRA; Even if the UEDs
Were Hazardous, GRG and Newtown PTA Are Not Liable
for Breach of Testing and Reporting Requirements.

Even if the UEDs in this case were solid waste as defined by
RCRA, Appellants have not adduced any direct evidence that
they qualified as hazardous waste under the pertinent
definitions. And even if they did qualify as hazardous waste,
GRG and Newtown PTA had no duty to test the UEDs and report
the results, because GRG and Newtown PTA are by no definition
“generators” of the alleged hazardous waste.
1. FRT and EPA Failed to Demonstrate that the UEDs
Were Hazardous.
RCRA defines hazardous waste as “solid waste [that may]
pose a substantial present or potential hazard. . .when
improperly. . . disposed of . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §6903(5). EPA has
promulgated a complex set of regulations detailing how specific
types of waste will be identified as hazardous. See 40 C.F.R. §
261.3 and sections cited therein.
Appellants have not demonstrated under either the statute
or any part of § 261 that the UEDs at issue in this case were
hazardous. UEDs are not listed under any of the explicit lists of
hazardous materials that EPA has promulgated. (R. at 12.) FRT
and EPA’s reliance on the testing provisions embodied in 40
C.F.R. § 261.24 is likewise unavailing.
The UEDs that GRG shipped to Sud-Americano have never
been tested, so FRT and EPA relied below on statistical
generalities regarding cell phones and CRT monitors in general—
to wit, that other UEDs have in the past failed toxicity tests. (R.
at 12.)
As the district court pointed out, this is only
circumstantial evidence that the actual UEDs sent in this case
were hazardous.
In fact, it is particularly weak circumstantial evidence: even
the study that FRT and EPA cited below did not find toxicity
exceeding EPA thresholds in all cell phones, and concluded only
that such devices “could potentially be classified as a. . .
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hazardous waste . . . .” Timothy, supra p. 26, at 1-3 (emphasis
added). In fact, the study acknowledges that the quantity of
various potentially toxic substances (e.g., lead) actually leached
into surrounding land or water depends in part upon other
substances comprising the material, such as iron and maybe
plastic, as well as the particle size of the finally disposed of
product. Id. at 2-8 to 2-9. Despite the fact-specific nature of the
inquiry, FRT and EPA have not presented any evidence relating
to MyPhones specifically (other than the fact that they contain
lead and mercury (R. at 5), which alone does not demonstrate
that those substances would be present in large enough amounts
or leach sufficiently to qualify as hazardous by EPA standards).
2. Even if the UEDs Met the Criteria for Hazardousness,
They Fall under the Household Waste Exception.
Even if FRT and EPA had adduced any evidence that the
UEDs were actually hazardous, they would still be exempt under
40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1), which exempts from the definition of
hazardous wastes all “household waste”—that is, “material
derived from households.” See also Chicago v. EDF, 511 U.S. at
334-35.
The undisputed facts show that nearly all of the material at
issue in this case came directly from Newtown households, and
thus falls squarely within the plain meaning of the exception. (R.
at 12.) In fact, the only factually grounded argument Appellants
have made against the application of the exception is that three
laptops were, at some indeterminate point, property of the EPA
itself. (R. at 13.)
EPA’s attempt to disqualify an entire shipment of household
items from the exception based on the presence of three EPA
laptops is more than simply ironic. It is also unseemly that EPA
should be able to sidestep its own regulation by alleging that it
irresponsibly disposed of its own waste. But even so, the evidence
adduced does not show that GRG and Newtown PTA got the
waste directly from EPA, rather than from a household. (R. at
13.) Nor do three laptops determine the nature of an entire
container of electronic items, the rest of which were clearly from
households (whether those households had opened the items or
not). (R. at 13.)

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/12
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3. Even If the UEDs Were Hazardous Waste Outside the
Household Waste Exception, GRG and Newtown PTA
Did Not Generate the Waste and Had No Duty to Test
the Materials or Report the Results of Such Tests.
Even if the UEDs here were properly labeled hazardous
waste, GRG and Newtown PTA had no duty to test and report, as
FRT and EPA allege. EPA’s own regulations establish testing
and reporting requirements only for generators of hazardous
waste. 40 C.F.R. § 262.11 (“A person who generates a solid waste,
as defined in [40C.F.R. § 261.2], must determine if that waste is a
hazardous waste”). Hazardous waste generation, in turn, is
defined by the statute as “the act or process of generating
hazardous waste.” 42 U.S.C. §6903(6).
Thus, in consonance with the plain language definition of
“generation,” GRG and Newtown PTA are not generators of the
allegedly hazardous waste in this case, even if it is hazardous. In
fact, Appellants have not alleged any facts that support the
conclusion that GRG and Newtown PTA generated the waste in
this case; therefore, the testing and reporting requirements are
quite simply inapplicable.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, GRG and Newtown PTA
respectfully request that this Court affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on all claims.
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